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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MACK HALLADAY and MERLE 
HALLADAY, 
Plaintiffs-
Appellants, 
vs. 
MADGE CLUFF, PERRY K. BIGELOW 
and NORMA G. BIGELOW, 
Defendants-
Respondents 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 17754 
Plaintiffs brought this action to quiet title to certain 
property located adjacent to property of defendants. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court quieted title in plaintiffs of the parcel 
w-x-Y-Z on Appendix Exhibit A attached hereto, and quieted 
title in defendant Bigelow of the area between Parcel 1 and 
Parcel 2 colored in brown on Appendix Exhibit A, and quieted 
title in defendants Cluff and Bigelow of Parcel P-M-N-0 on 
Appendix Exhibit A. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs respectfully request the court to reverse 
the decree of the lower court quieting title to Parcel P-M-N-0 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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on Appendix Exhibit A in defendants and quiet title to said 
parcel in plaintiffs. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 1927, the property in the area P-M-N-0 on Appendix 
Exhibit A was acquired by John E. Clift. (Record at 345). 
John E. Clift did not pay taxes on P-M-N-0 in 1946, 1947, 
1948, 1949, and 1950. (Record at 337). In 1951, Parcel 
P-M-N-0 was sold at a tax sale and was purchased by George 
Collard. A tax deed was issued to and recorded by Mr. Collard. 
Mr. Collard owned no other property in the vicinity of Parcel 
P-M-N-0. (Exhibit 29). 
On or about July 16, 1958 George E. Collard and Rosella 
J. Collard, his wife, conveyed Parcel P-M-N-0 to Albert 
Halladay and plaintiff Mack Halladay. (Exhibit 29). On 
or about November 7, 1958 Albert C. Halladay and Maude 
Halladay his wife quit claimed their interest in Parcel 
P-M-N-0 to plaintiffs Mack Halladay and Merle Halladay, 
his wife. (Exhibit 29). Plaintiffs had acquired Parcel 
7 on Appendix Exhibit A in 1950 and later acquired Parcel 
6 in 1961. (Exhibits 6 and 7). 
On the line M-N there exists a fence which was erected 
more than 50 years ago. There is no fence along the line 
O-P. (Record at 54). The property taxes on the parcel 
P-M-N-0 have been paid by plaintiffs since 1958. (Record 
at 199). 
Defendants Cluff and Bigelow have on occasion occupied 
-2-
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Parcel P-M-N-0 for the purposes of gardening and farming and 
business purposes. When plaintiffs purchased Parcel P-M-N-0 
in 1958, plaintiff Mack Halladay told defendant Perry Bigelow 
that he (Mr. Halladay) had purchased the P-M-N-0 property. 
(Record at 277). During the period from 1970 to 1980, Mr. 
Halladay informed Mr. Bigelow on several occasions that he 
(Mr. Halladay) owned the property and that Mr. Bigelow should 
not make use of the property. (Record at 278). Defendant 
Perry Bigelow did use part of Parcel P-M-N-0 with the permission 
of plaintiff Mack Halladay for the purpose of raising a 
garden. (Record at 176). In 1978, plaintiff Mack Halladay 
prevented defendant Perry Bigelow from building a potato 
cellar on the P-M-~-0 property. Plaintiff informed defendant 
Bigelow at that time that he (Mr. Halladay) owned the ground 
and that defendant Bigelow would have to move the potato 
cellar back onto his own property. (Record at 178). 
Prior to 1978, defendant Madge Cluff Kelson had never 
had any discussion or dispute with plaintiff Mack Halladay 
concerning the P-M-N-0 property. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DOCTRINE OF BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE IS 
INAPPLICABLE TO THIS CASE INASMUCH AS PLAINTIFFS 
ACQUIRED PARCEL P-M-N-0 AS A SEPARATE TRACT OF 
LAND AND INASMUCH AS P-M-N-0 WAS OWNED BY THIRD 
PARTIES UNTIL 1958. THE ONLY THEORY AVAILABLE 
TO DEFENDANT UNTIL 1958 WOULD BE ADVERSE POSSESSION. 
The court concluded that a boundary line had been estab-
,~~-;c;~~=.;0-~s~~oei~'2;·~ense. The court erred because the parcel of Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
land affected was owned by a third party during the pertinent 
time and thus was not susceptible to being affected by an 
agreement between these parties or their predecessors in 
interest. 
The lower court found that the M-N fenceline has marked 
the boundary of occupancy of the defendants Cluff and Bigelow 
and their predecessors' interests since before 1948. (Record 
at 54). However, the only period of occupancy by defendants 
that is material to this case is from the year 1958 when 
plaintiffs purchased Parcel P-M-N-0. The reason occupancy is 
not material is because P-M-N-0 was owned from 1927 to 1958 by 
third parties who did not own property north of the fenceline. 
For defendants to have acquired any ownership interest 
in Parcel P-M-N-0 prior to 1958, defendants would have had to 
have met the statutory requirements of adverse possession, 
Title 78-12-12 Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended. There was 
no evidence presented that defendants have paid any taxes on 
Parcel P-M-N-0 or that plaintiffs' predecessors in title 
acquiesced in the M-N fence as a boundary. Prior to 1958, 
Parcel P-M-N-0 was owned by the Clifts and the Collards. 
Defendants could not have acquired title by acquiescence to 
Parcel P-M-N-0 prior to a long period of years after 1958 when 
plaintiffs acquired that property. It is undisputed that 
defendants have not met the requirements of title by adverse 
possession to the Parcel P-M-N-0. 
Prior to plaintiffs' acquisition of Parcel P-M-N-0 in 
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1958, plaintiffs owned Parcel 7 as shown on Appendix Exhibit 
A. Plaintiffs ,acquired Parcel 6 in 1961. Therefore, defendant 
Cluff could not have acquired any title by the doctrine of 
boundary of acquiescence to Parcel P-M-N-0 prior to 1961 
inasmuch as plaintiffs otherwise would have been acquiescing 
away the entire parcel, rather than merely acquiescing in a 
certain fenceline as a boundary between adjoining parcels. 
Furthermore, the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence 
simply is not applicable to the facts of this case. This is 
not a case wherein Party B purchases Black Acre and Party 
W purchases White Acre and the two parties acquiesce in a 
certain existing fenceline as a boundary between White Acre 
and Black Acre. In this case, plaintiffs own White Acre 
and defendants own Black Acre. Subsequently plaintiffs 
purchased Green Acre (Parcel P-M-N-0) which lies between White 
Acre and Black Acre. A fence lies between Green Acre and 
White Acre. At the time plaintiffs purchased Green Acre, the 
fenceline M-N had been in existence for fifty years. Defendants 
are now attempting to acquire Green Acre in its entirety by 
claims of boundary by acquiescense. Although plaintiffs may 
have allowed defendants to occupy portions of Parcel P-M-N-0, 
plaintiffs did not purchase an entire parcel of ground simply 
to give it away to adjoining landowners. Purchasing real 
estate is not acquiescence that a third party may have it. 
Plaintiffs' purchase of Parcel P-M-N-0 is antithetical to 
their acquiescence in the M-N fence as a boundary between 
-5-
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plaintiffs' property and defendants' property. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED IN THE LOWER COURT IS 
INSUFFICIENT TO CREATE A PRESUMPTION OF 
BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE. 
Should the court find that the doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence is applicable to the facts of this case, that 
doctrine would not be applicable as between plaintiffs and 
defendants Bigelow until 1958, and as between plaintiffs and 
defendant Cluff until 1961, inasmuch as until those dates 
plaintiffs did not own property which would lend itself to 
acquiescence in the M-N fenceline as a boundary line. Plain-
tiffs did not acquire Parcel P-M-N-0 until 1958, and plaintiffs 
did not acuire Parcel 6 until 1961. In Fuoco v. Williams, 15 
Utah 2d 156, 389 ~· 2d 143 (1964) the court stated: 
This court over a period of years has formulated -
four elements which must be shown by the person 
claiming title by acquiescence in order to raise 
the presumption that a binding agreement exists 
settling a dispute or uncertain boundary. These 
elements are: (1) occupation up to a visible 
line marked definitely by monuments, fences or 
buildings and (2) acquiescence in the line as 
a boundary (3) for a long period of years (4) by 
adjoining landowners. If these four elements 
exist then it is incumbent upon him who assails 
title by acquiescence to show by competent evidence 
that a boundary was not thus established. But 
if the party claiming title by acquiescence fails 
to carry his burden and raise the presumption, 
then there is no case at all. 
389 P. 2d 145. 
In the present case, it is undisputed that defendants 
have occupied up to the visible M-N fence line on various 
occasions. However, it is disputed that there was acquiescence 
-6-
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in the M-N fence as a boundary line for a long period of years 
by adjoining landowners because P-M-N-0 was owned by third 
parties from 1921 until 1958. In Fuoco v. Williams, supra, 
the court reversed the decision of the lower court and remanded 
the case to the lower court because although "it was conceded 
that defendants had occupied the land up to the ditch for a 
long period of years and that the dispute was between adjoining 
landowners," there was no evidence that the defendants had 
acquiesced in the ditch as a boundary. Upon remand the lower 
court found that there had been mutual acquiescence, but the 
Supreme Court reversed that decision on appeal. 
In order to establish a boundary by acquiescence, 
it is not necessary that the acquiescence should be 
manifested by a conventional agreement, but recognition 
in acquiescence must be mutual, and both pa~ties must 
have knowledge of the existence of the line as a 
boundary line. 
* * * 
The Williams, who claiming title by acquiescence, 
have failed to prove all of the four elements necessary 
to raise the presumption that a binding agreement exists 
settling an uncertain boundary. Therefore, title to 
the disputed tract must be quieted in the Fuocos. 
Fuoco v. Williams, 18 Utah 2d 282 421 P. 2d 944, (1966). 
See also Goodman v. Wilkinso~, 629 P. 2d 447 (Utah 1981); Hales 
v. Frakes, 600 P. 2d 566 (Utah 1979). 
In Hales v. Frakes, supra, the court held that "the district 
court could properly determine in that case that the plaintiff's 
occupation to the fence without interference was not sufficient 
to establish defendant's acquiescence in the fence as a 
hnnnn~rv_" 600 P. 2d 559. 
-7-
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In the present case, there was no evidence that plaintiffs 
ever acquiesced in the M-N fence as a boundary line. The M-N 
fenceline represented the North boundary to a parcel of real 
estate plaintiffs purchased in 1958. (Record 173). Mack 
Halladay testified that in 1976 Provo City asked permission 
from him to put a heavier power line across Parcel P-M-N-0, 
and that Mr. Halladay helped in trimming the trees. He also 
testified that defendant Perry Bigelow used part of the 
P-M-N-0 property for a garden with the permission of plaintiff 
Mack Halladay. Plaintiff Halladay permitted defendant Bigelow 
to use his irrigation water in the garden. In 1978, plaintiff 
Halladay prevented defendant Bigelow from building a potato 
cellar on the P-M-N-0 parcel. He told defendant Bigelow that 
he (plaintiff Halladay} owned the ground at that time and that 
defendant Bigelow would have to move back onto his own property. 
(Record at 175-178). 
Defendant Bigelow testified that plaintiff Halladay had 
told him around 1957 that he (plaintiff Halladay) had purchased 
the P-M-N-0 property (the property was not actually purchased 
until 1958, however). He also testified that when he (defendant 
Bigelow} ever started to do something on the property that 
plaintiff Halladay would tell him that he should not do it and 
that he (plaintiff Halladay) owned it. Defendant Bigelow 
testified that plaintiff Halladay had so informed him off and 
on over the past ten years. (Record at 277-278). Defendant 
-8-
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Madge Cluff Kelson testified that between 1948 and 1978· she 
never had any discussion or dispute with plaintiff Halladay 
concerning the P-M-N-0 property. (Record at 223). 
There is no testimony that any question about a boundary 
line arose prior to 1978. Mr. Halladay has always claimed the 
P-M-N-0 property even though he allowed defendants to use it. 
Whether or not plaintiff acquiesced in the M-N fence as a 
boundary between plaintiffs' and defendants' property is a 
question of law which can be reviewed on appeal by this court. 
In Molden & Sons Inc., v. Osaka Landscaping and Nursery, Inc., 584 
P. 2d 968 (Wash. App. 1978), the court discussed the distinction 
between questions of law and questions of fact as follows: 
The trial court stated as a finding of fact, 
that the plaintiff had cured the breach. The 
fact that a court designates its determination 
as a "finding" does not make it so if it is in 
reality a conclusion of law. Under Washington 
practice a conclusion of law mislabled as a 
finding, will be treated as a conclusion. 
In Leschi v. Highway Comm'n., 84 Wash. 2d 271, 
at 283, 525 P. 2d 774, 783 (1974), a finding 
of fact was defined as an 
assertion that a phenomenom has 
happened or will be happening independent 
of or anterior to any assertion as to its 
legal effect. 
In applying that defini t-ion to the facts 
at hand, it is clear that whether the plaintiff 
had provided new cinders would be a finding 
of fact. However, whether the replacement 
of cinders constituted a "cure" is a determination 
of the legal effect of that action and is thus 
a conclusion of law. Therefore, the pertinent 
standard of review is whether the conclusion 
of law, that a cure resulted, is supported by 
the evidence. (Omitting citations). 
-9-
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Similarly in Cities Service Gas Company v. State 
Corporation Commission, 201 Kan. 223, 440 P. 2d 660 (1968) 
the court stated: 
An ultimate finding is a conclusion of law or 
at least a determination of law and fact. It 
is to be distinguished from the basic findings 
of primary evidentiary or circumstantial facts. 
It is subject to judicial review and, on such 
review, the court may substitute its judgment for 
that of the commission. (Helvering v. Tex-Penn. 
Co., 300 U.S. 481, 491, 57 S. Ct. 569, 81 L. Ed. 755.) 
440 P. 2d 661. 
In the present case, acquiescence is the legal effect of 
plaintiffs' a~ts with regard to the P-M-N-0 property. The 
only fact that indicates a possible acquiescence on the part 
of plaintiffs is that defendants occupied up to the M-N fence 
line on various occasions. However, there is substantial 
evidence to rebut any indication of an acquiescence by plaintiffs. 
As the coutt held in Hales v. Frakes, supra, the mere occupation 
of property to a fence line without interference does not 
necessarily result in acquiescence by the record title holder. 
Neither does the failure to claim to the true boundary line 
result in acquiescence. Hales v. Frakes, supra; Glen v. 
Whitney, 116 Utah 267, 209 P. 2d 257 (1949); Ringwood v. 
Bradford, 2 Utah 2d 119, 269 P. 2d 1053 (1954). 
As previously mentioned, plaintiffs have on many occasions 
claimed ownership of the P-M-N-0 parcel during the period 
of plaintiffs' alleged acquiescence in the M-N fence as a 
boundary line. The evidence not being sufficient to establish 
acquiescence on the part of plaintiffs, no presumption of 
boundary by acquiescence arises in this 
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Assuming, arguendo, that there were some evidence indicating 
an acquiescence on the part of the plaintiffs, the record indicate~ 
that any such period of acquiescence would be less than twenty 
years. Only in the "rarest of cases" may a boundary be establishec 
by acquiescence of less than twenty years. Hobson v. Panguitch 
Lake Corp., 530 P. 2d, 792 (Utah 1975); King v. Fronk, 14 Utah 
2d 135, 378 P. 2d 893 (1963). 
As to defendant Cluff, any period of acquiescence would 
not have begun until 1961, the year in which plaintiffs 
acquired Parcel 6. Prior to 1961, plaintiffs did not own any 
property north of the M-N-f.ence which would facilitate plaintiffs 
acquiescing in the M-N fence as a boundary between plaintiffs 
and defendant Cluff's property. It is inconceivable that 
plaintiffs would acquiesce in the M-N fence as a boundary 
between plaintiffs' and defendant Cluff's property prior to 
1961 since it would mean that plaintiffs would be giving away 
all of their land north of defendant Cluff's property. 
Therefore, any possible acquiescence on the part of plaintiffs 
with regard to the Cluff property would have been from 
1961 to 1978, a period of only seventeen years. 
As to defendants Bigelow, defendant Perry Bigelow tes-
tified that plaintiff Mack Halladay has told him off and on 
over the last ten years, that he (plaintiff Halladay) owned 
Parcel P-M-N-0. According to defendant Bigelow's testimony, 
plaintiff has claimed ownership of Parcel P-M-N-0 since 1958 
and more particularly since 1970. Therefore, any possible 
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acquiescence by plaintiffs could only have occurred from 1958 
to 1970, a period of only twelve years. 
The fourth element necessary to create a presumption of 
boundary by acquiescence is that there be mutual acquiescence 
by adjoining landowners. Prior to 1958, there could be no 
acquiescence because the landowners north of the M-N fence did 
not own the P-M-N-0 property. As to defendant Cluff, the 
property north of the M-N fence was not owned by the owner of 
the P-M-N-0 property until 1961. Therefore, as to defendants 
Bigelow there could be no acquiescence by adjoining landowners 
until 1958, and as to defendant Cluff there could be no 
acquiescence by adjoining landowners until 1961. 
Defendant having failed to establish three of the four 
elements necessary to create a presumption of boundary by 
acquiescence, the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence has no 
application to the facts of this case and title to the P-M-N-0 
property should be quieted in plaintiffs. 
POINT III 
ANY PRESUMPTION OF BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE WAS 
REBUTTED BY PLAINTIFFS' AND DEFENDANTS' EVIDENCE 
THAT THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT OR DISPUTE AS TO 
THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN THEIR RESPECTIVE PROPERTIES. 
Should the court determine that the evidence is sufficient 
to create a presumption of boundary line by acquiescence in the 
M-N fence, this presumption is rebutted by evidence that there 
was no agreement between plaintiffs and defendants as to the 
boundary between their properties. In Wright v. Clissold, 521 
P. 2d 1224 (Utah 1974) the court stated: 
-12-
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Once these elements are established the court is 
required to presume the existence of a binding 
agreement unless the party who assails it proves by 
competent evidence that there actually was no agree-
ment between the adjoining landowners or there could 
not have been a proper agreement. Facts which prove 
the latter include the following: (1) no parties 
available, e. g., sole ownership of the property 
with the existing line which was later transferred 
in tr acts ta· two or more other persons; { 2) the 
line was set for a purpose other than setting a 
boundary; (3) the absence of a dispute or 
uncertainty in fixing the boundary, and (4) possible 
mistake or inadvertance in locating the boundary 
on facts that would warrant relief in equity. 
521 P.2d 1226. 
In the present case there was never a dispute among the 
parties as to the boundary between their respective properties 
until 1978. This action was initiated in 1979 after defendants 
Bigelow had begun erecting a building which partially extended 
onto the P-M-N-0 property. Defendant Perry Bigelow testified 
that plaintiff Mack Halladay has informed him over the years 
that plaintiff Halladay owns the property and that defendant 
Bigelow should not use it. Plaintiff Halladay has given 
permission to Mr. Bigelow to use both the land and his 
irrigation water on other occasions, however. With respect to 
defendants Cluff, the evidence merely indicates that there has 
been no discussion regarding the boundary between plaintiffs' 
and defendant Cluff's property. 
In the absence of any dispute or uncertainty, and in 
light of plaintiffs' comments to defendants Bigelow, the 
evidence shows that there was no agreement among the parties 
as to the M-N fence being a boundary line between their 
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respective properties. Therefore any presumption that the M-N 
fence is a boundary line between plaintiffs' and defendants' 
property was rebutted by the evidence presented both by 
plaintiffs and by defendants. 
CONCLUSION 
The doctrine of boundary line by acquiescence is not 
applicable to the facts of this case because the property in 
dispute, parcel P-M-N-0, is part of a separate, identified 
tract of land created by deeds of conveyance in 1927 which was 
owned by third parties until 1958. The property in dispute is 
Green Acre located between Black Acre to the South and White 
Acre to the North. It is not part of a larger parcel of land 
severed by a fence erected because of an uncertainty as to the 
boundary between plaintiffs' (White Acre) and defendants' 
(Black Acre) property. The fenceline is the boundary between 
Green Acre and White Acre. 
The evidence is insufficient to create a presumption of 
boundary by acquiescence because the facts do not indicate 
acquiescence in the M-N fence as a boundary line for a long 
period of years by adjoining land owners. In any event, any 
presumption of boundary by acquiescence has been rebutted by 
evidence that there was no agreement that the M-N fence would 
serve as a boundary between plaintiffs' and defendants' 
property and there was no uncertainty as to the boundary 
between the parties' respective properties. Therefore, 
plaintiffs respectfully request the court to reverse the 
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holding of the lower court with respect to the P-M-N-0 property 
and quiet title to that property in the plaintiffs. 
Dated this _:/. day of /'.?a'V'-'<¢°(,1/ , 1982. /I 
l/ l 
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Mailed two copies of the foregoing Appellants' Brief, 
postage prepaid, to s. Rex Lewis, Esq., Attorney for Defendants 
Bigelow, and to M. Dayle Jeffs, Esq., Attorney for Defendant 
Cluff, addressed as follows: 
S. REX LEWIS 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys at Law 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah . 84601 
M. DAYLE JEFFS 
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Attorney at Law 
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